Rezcentrism is a framework for interpreting the resolution that centers on the resolution itself. It argues that the judge votes for or against the resolution itself, not the Affirmative team or plan (as in plancentrism). As a consequence, all in-round argumentation and most debate theory is based on the nature of the resolution.
Theoretical arguments for rezcentrism
Most proponents argue that the resolution is clearly intended to be a statement that can be affirmed or denied. The traditional phrasing "Resolved: That (some agency) should..." explicitly creates a true/false statement (and recalls the traditional phrasing of a parliamentary bill.) If the resolution were just a statement of topic, this phrasing would not be necessary. Certainly, since the earliest days of debating societies, resolutions have been worded in this manner and debated in a rezcentrist manner.
Opponents argue that this simply doesn't matter; i.e., there is no inherent reason to treat the wording of the resolution as anything more than tradition.
Basis for theory
Proponents argue that the resolution provides a coherent logical source for much everyday theory (the duties of the Affirmative and Negative teams, fiat, topicality, presumption, prima facie, etc.) These concepts arise as a natural consequence of rezcentrism. If another framework is adopted, they argue, they often become essentially arbitrary rules created to make debate work. Rezcentrist theory inherently ensures that there is a "right answer", instead of just subjective opinion.
Theoretical arguments against rezcentrism
Arguments based on topical counterplans
Most opponents start by arguing that topical counterplans are necessary (for various theoretical and intuitive reasons), and then point out that rezcentrism prevents topical counterplans; therefore, they argue, it should be rejected in favor of a framework that allows topical counterplans, like plancentrism or parametrics. For an in-depth discussion of arguments relating to topical counterplans, see the topical counterplans page.